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Introduction 
 
Civil Society networks1 have become a major player in global development (Miller 
2005, Church 2003). Over the last decade, donors have placed greater emphasis on 
civil society voice in encouraging pro-poor development through their inputs in policy 
formulation processes and then holding government to account and implementation 
(Ashman 2005). Civil Society Organisation (CSO) networks have been the prime 
organisational form for articulating the voice. This paper discusses the findings of a 
research project carried out among four CSO networks in Malawi with the aim to: 
 
• Understand the development of CSO networks in Malawi over the last four years;  
• Assess their contribution to poverty reduction and economic growth issues;  
• Assess their current strengths and challenges in articulating civil society voice;  
• Make stakeholders aware of the individual, organisational and environmental 
factors that promote and constrain networks’ impact; 
• Disseminate this information to other CSO networks and donors in Malawi and 
beyond. 
 
The research results provide a snapshot of civil society networks in Malawi today, 
whilst highlighting the critical organisational challenges in 2006. The project did not 
aim for nor did it achieve an exhaustive impact assessment of all civil society 
networks in the country. Interviews focussed on three networks: Malawi Economic 
Justice Network (MEJN), Land Task Force (LTF) and Civil Society Coalition on 
Basic Quality Education (CSCQBE). The findings therefore directly relate to these 
three networks; although they have resonance with other civil society networks in 
Malawi and globally. 
 
The main elements of the research methodology included: 
 
1. Literature review to provide an overview of current thinking (see references); 
2. Semi-structured interviews with up to 25 stakeholders for Malawi Economic 
Justice Network (MEJN), Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education 
(CSCQBE), Land Task Force (LTF), other CSO networks, donors, and 
government;  
3. Analysis of consultancy work with MEJN and Civil Society Agriculture Network 
(CISANET); 
4. Analysis and write up; 
5. Publication and dissemination. 
 
The paper will briefly discuss the development impact of the CSOs before proceeding 
to discuss the critical organisational capacity issues facing the networks. It closes by 
James, R. and C. Malunga. 2006. Organisational challenges facing civil society networks in Malawi. 
KM4D Journal 2(2): 48-63 
www.km4dev.org/journal 
 
 
49 
discussing the key strategic choices facing the networks in their attempts to address 
the identified challenges. 
 
 
CSO networks’ performance in Malawi 
 
Evaluating the impact of advocacy work is notoriously difficult given the variety of 
variables that influence a situation at any one time. Direct attribution of change to one 
particular variable, such as the work of a CSO network, is impossible. What is both 
possible and paramount is to be able to ‘plausibly associate’ changes with the 
activities of the network. This short research never intended to rigorously evaluate the 
impact of the CSO networks, but the findings do highlight stakeholder perceptions of 
the major areas of achievement (which could be validated later by an indepth study). 
 
The study showed that CSO networks have undoubtedly made a significant and 
visible difference in terms of representing civil society, in developing relationships 
with policy-making structures and even in achieving some results in a short period. 
An alternative voice and opinion to government now exists and is accepted. The 
magnitude and sustainability of these contributions to the development process, 
however, is open to debate.  
 
Some government respondents were at best ambivalent about the value of CSO 
networks – they question the capacity on both an organisational and individual level, 
which need to be surmounted before they can begin to be truly effective. Further, 
relationships of trust between a network and its members are often based more on 
respect for particular individuals than commitment to the organisation or sector as a 
whole. Moreover, limited expertise of staff meant that CSO networks are seen as 
stronger in criticising government than in offering practical alternatives. In the words 
of one government respondent: “The role of CSOs in engaging with government is 
taken seriously, but not the CSOs itself”. All in all, CSO networks are not living up to 
their ascribed role due to their failure to address major and urgent organisational 
issues. This is a very current and increasing cause of concern for members, boards and 
donors to CSO networks. These issues need to be analysed and addressed if CSO 
network performance is to be maintained and developed.  
 
 
Organisational challenges facing CSO networks 
 
CSO networks in Malawi are facing a number of pressing organisational issues that 
demand urgent attention in order for the networks to survive. The literature referenced 
shows that these challenges are common to all CSO networks, and not unique to 
Malawi. What is different in Malawi is the severity of the challenges and the urgency 
of action required. 
 
Identity crisis 
The most striking finding of the whole research was that almost every respondent 
highlighted organisational identity as the biggest current challenge facing CSO 
networks. As CSO networks established secretariats, registered and secured project 
funding from donors, they found themselves working increasingly independently from 
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their members. It has reached the stage where the most important question that 
network leadership and governance needs to answer is: will we remain as an authentic 
CSO network or become an advocacy NGO with nominal membership? 
 
This challenge has arisen from the process of institutionalisation that CSO networks 
have followed, as well as from the exigencies of the Malawian context. As network 
founders became over-stretched by the demands and opportunities of the network, so 
secretariats were established and coordinators appointed. Networks had no clear legal 
status at this stage. Initially, member organisations often hosted secretariats but this 
caused some confusions and tensions. For example, hosts sometimes felt they were 
over-contributing to the network, while others believed that hosts were taking 
advantage of network resources to pay their own organisations bills, such as 
telephones. In some cases hosts were very reluctant to let go of their secretariat 
function, though most networks have now moved on to set up an independent office.  
 
In theory, network secretariats coordinate their members to carry out the work, but 
this has rarely worked out in practice in the Malawian cases examined. The far more 
frequent scenario is for members to give, or for the secretariat to take increasing 
responsibility for implementing advocacy activities. Although members do often 
attend network meetings (particularly those members who are easily contactable by 
phone or e-mail), they fail to implement their action plan commitments once they are 
back in maelstrom of their own organisations.   
 
Ultimately CSO staff are not paid or appraised on time spent on network activities. 
The more commitment they give to the network the more their own organisation and 
their own work suffers. For this reason, network activities are pushed to the 
background. 
 
While advocacy work may be part of job descriptions in Malawian CSOs, it is rarely 
part of funded projects. Members still rarely plan network activities into their 
strategies and proposals. This is partly because management of member CSOs still 
does not consider advocacy through CSO networks as a strategic priority and often 
hurriedly develops proposals and budgets without sufficient consultation with staff 
involved in the CSO networks. Most local CSOs are characterised by short-term, 
survival-oriented goals that focus on service delivery rather than advocacy. Even 
international NGO members of networks, who have funded advocacy work, have not 
been able to participate as much as needed in network activities; often because their 
work is tied to implementing their own pre-determined plans and budgets. They are 
not able to flexibly respond to last-minute requests from networks - yet this a critical 
part of advocacy networks. Local NGO members have fewer staff and less capacity 
than their international counterparts. The lack of technical capacity has hampered 
network performance in certain areas: for example, only three people in the LTF are 
said to really understand the 70 land laws in the country that directly affect their work. 
When issues are too technical, members do not respond or engage with issues, again 
leaving it to secretariat staff.  
 
This situation is exacerbated by the donors who prefer to fund one network than ten 
different partners’ time to do this – thereby strengthening the secretariat but 
weakening members. As a result, secretariats have raised funding independently, 
rather than being driven by the demands of their members, and have consequently 
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acquired contractual obligations to deliver outputs – for which member organisations 
are responsible. This is partially due to members (including board members) being too 
caught up in the demands of their own organisations to engage in proposal 
development for the network. Once the secretariat is awarded project funding it gains 
power in a very resource-dependent context: access to resources is closely correlated 
to authority. Whilst this access to resources has led to network secretariats becoming 
sources of contracts for members, secretariat staff rarely has any prior experience with 
sub-contracting arrangements and the performance management demands this places 
on them. They are not set up to monitor their members, and awarding contracts to one 
member instead of another can cause significant internal conflict. Ultimately, with 
secretariats providing resources to members, rather than vice versa, the network 
power balance turns upside down, shifting from members to secretariat.  
 
Efforts by secretariats to involve members by sub-contracting have yielded 
disappointing results. Members have failed to deliver on their contracted 
commitments in the stipulated time. In one case, involving members delayed the 
project proposal finalisation by nine months; in another case, members failed in 
financial accountability and resources were not used for the intended purposes. When 
some members received resources for international network meetings, they failed to 
account for the resources.  
 
CSO networks have found it difficult to make the out-sourcing approach work, 
contracting project work, such as research and monitoring, from the secretariat to 
members. Secretariats have found that it is much quicker and less risky to hire staff 
themselves (or contract in consultants or enumerators). This means that, as one 
respondent said: 
 
Instead of secretariats ‘engaging’ with members, they are shifting more 
towards ‘informing’ members.  
 
Questions concerning the quality of member contact with the community have 
encouraged secretariats to decentralise and set up their own regional offices and 
district chapters. The theory is that member NGOs run the local offices and although 
this works in some cases, it has often led to these being perceived as parallel 
structures, leading to jealously and internal competition. 
 
By taking on what is in fact the role of its members and by-passing them, CSO 
networks risk even cannibalising as donors may shift resources from network 
members to the network secretariat. The bigger secretariats become, the more money 
and resources are needed. Costs start to rise when the secretariat becomes 
synonymous with the network and the secretariat begins to become more and more 
operational, doing more of the work itself. This is where traditional core costs start to 
take on greater prominence with more staff and equipment being needed (Church, 
2003).  
 
In some cases, the network exists more in name than in reality – certainly the spirit 
and vision of some networks is under threat if not already undermined. According to 
one donor: 
 
James, R. and C. Malunga. 2006. Organisational challenges facing civil society networks in Malawi. 
KM4D Journal 2(2): 48-63 
www.km4dev.org/journal 
 
 
52 
The strength of the network has become based on the strength of the 
secretariat, not the members. This is not what we expected or hoped for. They 
are contravening their purpose and compromising their vision.  
 
Relationship and trust are the ‘connective tissue’ in networks – and once these are 
gone, the networking element is gone too. 
 
What the ‘network model’ amongst CSOs exactly comprises is still very unclear. In 
different capacity building processes over the past few years, each of the CSO 
networks has highlighted the need to clarify the criteria for membership and the 
different roles of members/secretariat/board. But none has done anything significant 
to address this need. The following questions were raised by a strategic meeting of 
networks in 2004 aimed at improving relations between members, board and 
secretariat: 
 
• Who owns the network?  
• Who implements programmes?  
• In what capacity is the coordinator speaking when addressing the press? As an 
individual, as the secretariat or as the network of members?  
• How do members cope with a dual allegiance to the network and their own 
organisation?  
 
These questions have still not been answered. MEJN set up a task force on 
membership criteria, but never delivered its recommendations as members of the task 
force kept changing.  
 
Overall, we see that CSO networks lack clear membership criteria and generally 
charge no fees – with the exception of CSCQBE, who managed to collect only 50% of 
its members’ fees. This makes membership very fluid and mobile, enabling networks 
to claim large numbers, of whom only few are really committed. This undermines the 
ability of the network to claim it is speaking on behalf of civil society. Operating 
procedures and board policies have not been developed, let alone implemented. Board 
members are also network members and because of this they sometimes find 
themselves in a conflict of interest – requesting that the secretariat subcontracts their 
organisation (and in some cases themselves) for particular pieces of work.  
 
CSO networks in Malawi are currently facing an identity crisis. They need to pause 
and question who they really want to be and what their focus is. This is the biggest 
organisational issue they face and failure to address it in the near future could lead to 
the demise of certain CSO networks in practice, if not in name. As one board chair 
pointed out: ‘The moment we say we can do it on members’ behalf we have lost the 
game.’ 
 
Leadership challenges 
Another pressing strategic challenge for CSO networks in Malawi today is leadership. 
In any small organisation in its early years of life, it is difficult to disassociate 
organisational performance from the performance of the leader. As such, the the 
performance of the coordinator will be reflected in the performance of the network. 
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Most of the CSO networks have appointed young, dynamic activists as coordinators, 
often in the initial stages of network formation where there was goodwill, but no 
funding nor the security to lure mature CSO leaders from established positions. This 
‘youth policy’ has been good from the perspective of raising the profile and visibility 
of the advocacy networks. 
 
Often, impossible demands are placed on one person’s shoulders, and the coordinator 
is expected to excel at everything. For example, coordinators are expected to deal with 
constant media attention, whereby it is often the coordinator’s opinion that is 
solicited. However, high media visibility of an individual can often leave members 
feeling excluded and can encourage a coordinator to behave more independently. 
Does the leadership catalyse the energies of the members or absorb them like a 
sponge? 
 
Few of the CSO coordinators are strong on planning and administration. They tend to 
react to events, rather than operate proactively as leaders. But membership 
participation generally does not happen spontaneously. Once a secretariat is 
established, performance of the network will depend strongly on its leadership, more 
than the members. The leadership in CSO networks is still highly dependent on a 
small number of key individuals, which makes them more vulnerable, especially when 
networks take on more of the implementing function. For example, the departure of 
the MEJN coordinator led to a visible drop in performance according to donors. Other 
networks have clearly shown that when a network has a poorly performing 
coordinator, the performance of the whole network is compromised.  
 
Yet, leadership in CSO networks depends on much more than an individual 
coordinator. The governance structures of the networks play a key role in the 
leadership, and nascent organisations need active, engaged boards. The three networks 
explored here have some very strong board members – a major factor in their survival 
to date. Some efforts to develop sub-committees to support leadership in certain areas 
have worked well, in the CSCQBE in particular. Others have been less successful: one 
CSO network has been on the verge of collapse for the last few years due to a clash 
between the Chair and the Coordinator, which led to the latter being fired from his 
post, but reinstated on the ‘requirement’ of the donor.  
 
When CSO networks steering groups formalise into registered entities, they have to 
decide how to choose and perpetuate their boards. Many are tempted towards a 
‘democratic’ election process from amongst the membership, though this has often 
resulted in weak, politicised boards as members have little personal commitment and 
passion. Further, this leads to a potential conflict of interest between active network 
member and part of the governance. In most of the networks in Malawi, boards are 
selected based on their knowledge and experience in certain fields. Some of the 
networks, however, have opted for a hybrid of these two in order to get the best of 
both worlds. 
 
Currently some network boards are not giving sufficient direction, not making policy 
and instead getting too involved in micro-managing non-policy issues (e.g. organising 
workshops, consultancies, deciding who should go for training). Many board 
members are busy in senior posts in their own NGOs and consequently are weak in 
following through. The relatively frequent turnover of board members has caused 
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delays in activity, as new board members are reluctant to implement changes until 
they have become better acquainted with the organisation. 
 
All in all, it is clear that CSO networks need strong leadership both within the 
secretariat as within the board. Weaknesses in either area are proving very inhibiting 
for CSO networks in Malawi to flourish.  
 
Strategy 
CSO networks are expected to play a diversity of roles for their different stakeholders: 
members, government and donors. This requires a strong guiding strategy – but the 
research in fact highlighted lack of strategy as a pitfall facing CSO networks in 
Malawi today.  
 
The media pressures CSO networks to respond and react to every issue. CSO 
networks are expected to be able to coordinate their members’ activities, to unify 
them in clear advocacy campaigns, to build member capacity and to facilitate member 
funding. Some of these roles are inextricably linked, such as advocating and building 
the capacity of members to advocate. Both are key priorities, as CSO network 
advocacy will be undermined if members have insufficient capacity, technical 
understanding and even time to contribute. 
 
The capacity building role of networks has in some degree compromised the energy 
and resources that networks have been able to devote to advocacy, but as one 
respondent questioned: 
 
What is a network to do if members do not have the technical analytical 
capacity to understand the issues; no advocacy skills or experience? 
 
Some of the networks have addressed these different demands through strategic 
planning processes (e.g. MEJN, CISANET, LTF, and soon CSCBQE). In reality 
however CSO networks have been ambivalent about implementing strategic 
decisions: reluctance to focus on specific activities and withdraw from others is 
partially fuelled by lack of time. However necessary capacity building activities are, 
the more difficult it seems to organise them. Change has also been inhibited by 
limited commitment to implementation. While on the one hand networks yearn for 
greater focus, they still want to retain considerable flexibility, especially in response 
to those activities that are resourced. 
 
Funding 
Funding sources and sizes evidently influence how CSO networks behave. Networks 
look almost exclusively to international funding sources for their support, rather than 
from members, and only CSCQBE claims to charge membership fees. Consequently, 
this undermines most CSO networks’ sense of accountability to their members.  
 
From 2002-2006 there has been considerable growth in the quantity of funding for 
CSO networks as well as an increasing diversity of donors. This may be linked to the 
shift in aid funding towards ‘rights-based approaches’. Funding for CSO networks has 
therefore not been a major problem during this period, and in fact a new concern that 
CSO networks have been over-funded, causing laxity in accountability and 
encouraging secretariats to take on an implementing role on behalf of members.  
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The quality of the funding has also been a major issue. The Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) initially supported MEJN by coordinating a basket 
funding approach to support the work of the whole organisation, rather than individual 
projects. In general however donor coordination has been poor. For example, in one 
case a new donor stepped in to fund a network, just at the same time when all other 
donors were withholding funding in order to precipitate a crisis and force the network 
to address critical issues. 
 
Some of the network funding has been for donor ‘self-centred’ reasons of 
administrative simplicity and efficiency. As one respondent noted: 
 
We can achieve the same in advocacy and capacity building by focussing on 
one partner, not 20. 
 
While it is certainly administratively simpler to fund one organisation instead of 20, in 
a real sense this diverts support from network members to network secretariats. As a 
result, advocacy work of individual members remains unfunded and therefore 
members cannot support the networks themselves with time or money. 
 
Some official donors and even some international NGOs are increasingly looking to 
CSO advocacy coalitions to become their funding channels. Their – overly simplistic 
– reasoning is that if a coalition has many members, it can easily serve as a conduit 
for their funding to a variety of CSOs; this ignores the fact that coalitions fulfil 
different and often mutually exclusive purposes, and are not always equipped for 
project management, administration and monitoring. Some Malawian CSO coalitions 
do not have sufficient self-identity and financial security to say ‘no’.  
 
Today, the infatuation with CSO networks appears to be abating. Performance and 
reporting problems of networks has led to greater realism, and even to scepticism 
amongst donors. As one major donor in Malawi pointed out: 
 
CSO network weaknesses are forcing us to find alternative ways of working… 
We are funding individual NGOs to do the same things - especially as 
networks increasingly resemble individual NGOs – what value are they 
adding? 
 
As a result, funding for CSO networks has reverted to more short-term tied support. 
Donors have found that:  
 
…3 month project-based funding works better with CSO networks in Malawi 
in terms of getting things done. 
 
Yet this also encapsulates the short-term donor approach that has undermined 
development performance for years.  
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Challenges: the origins 
 
Why are CSO networks facing such serious pitfalls? Are they inherent to the 
organisational form of networks? Are they a result of individuals and organisations 
involved, or are they simply due to adapting to the harsh realities of the Malawian 
CSO context? 
 
Networks will evolve and adapt to suit their external context, including their 
membership base, as well as in response to internal dynamics. We need to examine 
the different influences of four key variables: 
 
• External environment 
• Network Members 
• Secretariat 
• Leadership 
 
External environment 
The external environment exerts a very powerful influence on network performance – 
particularly in resource-poor countries like Malawi. The needs of communities are 
overwhelming and place very high developmental demands on government and civil 
society. There is a sparse institutional landscape to respond, with few strong CSOs. 
 
HIV/AIDS and migration 
HIV/AIDS is exacerbating the demands on and reducing the capacity of an already 
very weak sector. 
 
The mobility of the sector obviously causes significant problems for CSO networks. 
One of the striking findings of the research was the fluidity of the human resource 
environment. Since conducting this research four years ago, more than 80% of CSO 
network stakeholders interviewed the first time had left their organisation and (as a 
result) quit contact with the network. Between 2002 and 2005, of the three CSO 
networks, every board chair had left the country, every coordinator was new and 
active members, donors and government staff were largely different. In local CSOs 
job insecurity is very high and the expanding number of operational international 
NGOs in Malawi often recruit the best local NGO staff. Government transfers staff 
between departments and jobs with confusing regularity. Donor staff is often ex-
patriate and moves on regularly after their ‘tour of duty’. This means the networks 
have a completely new set of relationships both internally and externally – and are, in 
effect, completely different networks. 
 
Donor influences 
Resources are scarce and CSOs find themselves focusing on individual project 
funding. Donors however have a preference for ‘big’ projects, and like to see quick 
results in rights-based areas such as advocacy. They do not appear to have the time or 
inclination to invest in the capacity building of network members in advocacy and 
prefer to just support the network. The International Forum on Capacity Building 
global survey (IFCB 2001) found that even successful CSO networks were not 
participating in international development initiatives receiving major donor funding. 
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In the past, there have been some laudable efforts at encouraging greater donor 
coordination in their support of CSO networks, though this appears to have largely 
disintegrated in the past year, as donors’ individual agendas have come more to the 
fore. 
 
Changing policy environment 
The policy environment is also changing rapidly. Accountability systems are not well 
developed and there are only a few societal watchdogs, whilst the work abounds. For 
instance, while there has been admirable work done by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, it 
still occurs that government appoints Cabinet Ministers who have been dismissed by 
previous employers for mismanagement of funds. All in all, there is ample work for 
CSO networks. 
 
Government support for networks is ambivalent. The official line is increasingly 
supportive, but on an individual level there is still quite some resistance from 
government staff.  
 
Politics are personal in Malawi. The focus is on opinion rather than issues. The media 
penchant for personalising news and the limited number of people it can quote, makes 
it difficult for coordinators to avoid making statements and being seen as co-opting 
the network as their personal mouthpiece. 
 
Network members 
CSO networks require members to be able to work inter-dependently with each other. 
But many of the network members, particularly in the young CSO sector in Malawi, 
are more at the dependent stage of development:  
 
Survival first 
For most CSO network members, their own survival is paramount. Local NGOs have 
very limited ‘spare’ capacity to support the work of networks as their advocacy work 
is still rarely funded. They have a wide diversity of interests and therefore pull the 
network in different directions, but few have the time or money to resource the 
network. In addition, most CSO members have weak contact with their constituencies 
– then how can we expect the network to be representative in turn? 
 
Building relationships 
Research on successful CSO networks highlights the importance of pre-existing 
relationships between CSO members (Ashman 2005), but in Malawi the sector is still 
so young that these relationships are only developing now. Many CSO members are 
still at an early stage of development, and few understand the responsibilities that 
come with being a network member, such as working inter-dependently. 
As such, it is too early for CSO networks to really thrive in Malawi, until the capacity 
of the sector is strengthened, which does not happen overnight.  
 
Balanced leadership 
The strength of CSO networks will largely reflect their membership. If they have 
strong, high performing members with secure funding bases, a CSO network is likely 
to mirror that. The reverse, however, is also true and perhaps more common.  
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As secretariats gain strength, members tend to slip back into a common role of sitting 
back and listening to the leader. On the one hand, the network coordinator is 
increasingly given the status of the ‘boss’ and members sit back waiting to be told 
what to do. On the other hand, international NGO (INGO) members are often 
frustrated by the last minute, reactive ways of networks. Many INGOs have highly 
developed and structured planning systems that mean that they are too busy or simply 
not equipped to support network activities, particularly at the last minute.  
 
Secretariat 
 
Limited capacities 
The participation of members is the essence of networking. Facilitation is the core 
secretariat process. But secretariats tend to have very few staff and it is not 
uncommon for all responsibility to be dumped on one person’s shoulders. Staff often 
has limited experience and expertise in the process of networking, and in the technical 
aspects of policy analysis, the network’s core business.  
 
Accountability  
Yet with donors as opposed to members being the main funding source, secretariat 
attention focuses on the donor project rather than the participation of members. 
Accountability is directed to donors, not to members. This becomes a viscous circle: 
as secretariats detach themselves from the membership, so their structures grow, their 
costs increase, and their need for donor support increases too, spiralling them out of 
reach of their members and constituents. 
 
Leadership 
CSO networks are very complex organisational forms to manage. They are dependent 
on the individual coordinator, especially in the first phase of their development. 
Nascent organisations without secure financing can only attract people initially in a 
voluntary capacity. But once funding is secured, posts are rarely advertised and 
young, voluntary incumbent activists will often take on the network coordination role. 
However, they rarely have the networking aptitude or the management experience to 
make the core process work effectively.  
 
 
Strategic choices for CSO networks 
 
While the three networks are at different stages of development, this research has 
highlighted two core issues that must be addressed to ensure future network impact 
and even survival for all of them. Boards and secretariats with support from donors 
need to resolve first, their identity crises and next, the issue of leadership. Once these 
issues are addressed, the networks can go on to deal with on-going questions of 
strategy, structure, systems and staffing. 
 
Recommendations to develop network identity 
In terms of their identity crisis, CSO networks in Malawi have two choices: 
 
1. Become more independent from their members and operate largely as an 
‘advocacy NGO’ with nominal membership (thereby ceasing to be an ‘authentic’ 
network); 
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2. Re-assert the commitment to being a constituents’ network and ensure the network 
model works better. 
 
Unless there is a deliberate strategic decision, by default the aid system (short-term 
donor demands and deadlines) and individual interests (of secretariat staff) will push 
the networks towards option 1, the ‘advocacy NGO’ route, which is the easier option. 
Instead of having to build capacity in members, ‘networks’ can build capacity of their 
staff in their district branches. Moreover, in the next five years there is likely to be 
less donor funding for CSO networks, driven by the official aid system push for short-
term measurable results and increasing disillusionment with the management and 
legitimacy of CSO networks. 
 
But is this the direction that network governance and leadership want to take? Will 
members fight for network identity? Experience suggests that it is likely that members 
will make noise at AGMs to influence this decision, and then move to concentrate on 
their own organisational issues. 
 
Even so, maintaining space for member participation is key to network survival and 
vibrancy. This will be a big challenge, requiring exceptional and concerted leadership 
commitment and drive, member engagement and enlightened donor support. 
Recommendations include:  
 
• Developing criteria for membership and contractually agreeing to membership 
with the network Chair and the member organisation Director. This may mean that 
CSO networks see their membership numbers fall, but inviting fewer but better 
quality members could compensate this;  
• Encouraging members to provide resources for the network. An effective 
secretariat is ‘owned’ by its members, and this means that secretariat resources 
must come from members, not vice versa. Particularly in a resource-scarce 
environment, a concerted strategy is needed to ensure that members build network 
activities into budget lines; 
• Having a membership development strategy that involves recruiting, inducting 
and training new and existing members; 
• Keeping members organisations accountable for their conduct in the same way 
that networks want to hold government accountable; 
• Clarifying member, board and secretariat roles and job descriptions. Difficult 
questions need to be resolved: to what extent can the secretariat stretch its arms 
without getting board approval? On which issues should the secretariat seek the 
consent of the board? Who has the mandate to make public statements to the 
press? When secretariats request for feedback on issues from members and there 
is no response, secretariats often still feel obliged to say something. But does 
silence mean consent? How much agreement is needed to release a press 
statement?  
 
Recommendations to develop network leadership 
The second issue of critical importance for CSO networks in Malawi is that of 
leadership. Given the networks’ small size and stage of development, the quality of 
the coordinator has a large influence on the performance of the network. CSO 
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networks will continue to drift away from their core purpose if they fail to attract 
leaders who are committed to networking principles: 
 
1. A relational networker, who has the humility to actively listen to others, build 
consensus, resolve conflict and facilitate joint action; 
2. A manager and planner; 
3. An environmental analyst; 
4. A persuasive and active advocate. 
 
In the past, coordinators have been appointed based on their ability in the fourth 
criterion alone. By offering longer-term contracts with funded budgets, CSO networks 
will be able to attract more mature, experienced people to these positions. 
 
But network leadership rests with much more than an individual. Collective 
leadership is needed – and active participation by members is the prime means for 
CSO networks to achieve their purpose. Moreover, supportive boards are critical for 
any significant change in performance and capacity of CSO networks, and to help 
form the identity of the organisation. First though, the governance structures of CSO 
networks need to be developed, clarifying roles and channels of communication 
between the board and the coordinator.  
 
For reasons of legitimacy, representation from network members on the board is an 
advantage, with named individuals contributing to continuity. Supplementing the 
board with outside professionals can bring expertise and critical distance to 
discussions. A potential conflict of interest clause must be clearly stated within the 
Constitution and adhered to.  
 
Where possible, board members and further network members should be involved in 
proposal development processes. The board Chair should be responsible for signing 
donor contracts to ensure that they fit with the organisational strategy, especially in 
terms of member involvement, and for monitoring coordinator work and travel plans 
on a regular basis. 
 
CSO networks must develop their foundational values if they are to achieve their 
goals. They cannot presume to hold government to account or assist in formulating 
and implementing government policies, unless the same standards in accountability 
are applied to their own leaders and members, and their own internal policies are 
developed. If CSO networks compromise on their core values then they have lost; it is 
a leadership responsibility to ensure they walk their talk. 
 
Recommendations to develop strategy and structure 
CSO networks have to make choices in their responses to stakeholders, and this is 
amplified by changes in the external environment. For example, once the Land Law is 
passed by government, the LTF will have to rethink its role. Should it respond to 
broader food security issues as its donors would like? A strategy change is imminent.  
 
CSO networks in Malawi tend to over-structure while relatively simple, informal 
structures would be easier to manage. The ideal is to minimise structure in order to 
promote effective participation of members, fitting the purpose of the network. 
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Conclusions 
 
CSO networks in Malawi have clearly made a contribution over the last four years to 
better represent the voice of the poor in policy decisions; they have improved 
relationships with government and they have had measurable results in government 
policy development. They have been actively involved in monitoring budget 
implementation, which can be plausibly associated with better governance. Sustaining 
these changes remains a challenge and greater credibility amongst government 
officials needs to be developed, but CSO networks have come a long way. 
 
Networks are inherently unstable organisational forms with strong emotional and 
ideological forces pulling them towards being more of a people’s movement. At the 
same time there are strong pragmatic forces from the external environment pushing 
them in the direction of advocacy NGOs with nominal membership and secretariat-
managed funding and resources. CSO networks in Malawi are struggling with this and 
increasingly drifting away from their networking function.  
 
Already members, donors and some board members are increasingly disgruntled with 
their secretariats. They perceive that the performance of CSO networks is declining. 
Members are investing less time in the networks and the knowledgeable and 
committed donors are withdrawing, citing poor performance from the networks. CSO 
networks themselves have very limited systems for monitoring and evaluating their 
impact. In some cases, staff appears blissfully ignorant of the performance problems 
and does not realise the urgency of addressing the organisational issues. 
 
CSO networks will exist as networks only in name and become de facto advocacy 
NGOs if the issue of membership participation is not addressed soon. Whilst this is a 
realistic and not necessarily negative option, a decision for such a shift of identity 
should be taken deliberately by the governance and leadership of the organisation, and 
should not happen inadvertently.  
 
Re-asserting network identity requires significant organisational changes, for instance 
in terms of developing the leadership and governance of the network secretariats to 
ensure that they are able to deliver on their core networking process. Member 
contributions will need to be prioritised and systems set up to motivate, measure and 
track the most vital resource – the participation and commitment of members. CSO 
networks have focused on measuring project outputs, rather than on the difficult, but 
important developmental task of networking and building member capacity and 
ownership.  
 
Rather than blindly following the institutional forms of others, CSO networks need to 
think through how they can retain as much dynamism and flexibility as possible, in 
order to mobilise their constituents and achieve their priority objectives together.  
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Abstract 
This article summarises the results of an applied research project undertaken by 
INTRAC. The research project aimed in particular to understand the development of 
civil society networks in Malawi over the last four years, assess their contribution to 
poverty reduction and economic growth issues, and appraise their current strengths 
and challenges in articulating civil society voice. 
 
The paper emphasises that CSO networks need to make strategic choices in the areas 
of identity and leadership. CSO networks need to decide whether to move towards 
more independence from their members and operate largely as advocacy NGOs with 
nominal membership, or to re-assert the commitment to being a network, working 
more efficiently and effectively in terms of achieving network goals. Lastly, CSO 
networks will drift away from their core purpose unless they attract leaders who are 
committed to networking principles. 
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1
 A civil society organisation or CSO has a constituency base and does not fall under a government or 
business organisational form. Whilst NGOs are part of civil society, CSO is a wider term, also 
encompassing more informal organisations. When CSO networks want to take on an organisational 
form in Malawi, they often register as NGOs under the trustees act or company limited by guarantee. 
